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For more than two decades the Global 
Environmental Governance (GEG) 
system has been a story of growth, and 
there is much progress to celebrate: 
scores of new international institutions; 
a proliferation of legal instruments, 
declarations, and financial mechanisms; 
growing public interest; multiple layers 
of national structures; an impressive 
knowledge economy serviced by 
multitudes of experts in governments, 
academia and in civil society. Most 
importantly, perhaps, the idea of 
sustainable development is now firmly 
ensconced as the very central goal of all 
environmental governance. Arguably, 
environmental governance can now only 
be understood within the context of the 
sustainable development imperative. 
Despite the fact that there is much to 
be justifiably proud of in this growth 
in the infrastructure of governance, the 
global challenges have in fact multiplied 
in both number and intensity. This is 
partly because our understanding of 
the extent and nature of many of the 
challenges has itself grown, and many 
of the problems have proven to be far 
more complex and difficult to deal 
with than we had once assumed. But it 
is also evident that while much of the 
global effort has focused on negotiating 
agreements, there has been little 
focus on implementing the 
agreements or holding 
international actors 
accountable for their global 
commitments. One does 
not wish to be harsh in this 
assessment, since we are still 
in the relatively early days of 
this global enterprise. However, 
as we prepare for the forthcoming 2012 
United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development 
(known as “Rio+20”), 
an accountability and 
implementation deficit now 
stares us squarely in the 
face. And Rio+20 would be 
a very good moment to start 
seriously addressing this deficit.
Stakeholders at all levels are 
aware of the urgency for the GEG 
system to deliver on its promise of 
implementation. However, there are 
obstacles to achieving this goal, none 
more important than a widely prevalent 
‘culture of unaccountability.’ For years, 
talk of accountability was feared by 
many who considered it a threat and 
resisted by others who saw it as a 
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distraction from ‘real issues.’ We 
believe that this is no longer the 
case. There is a growing realization 
of the costs of unaccountability, 
an evolution of norms in related 
governance areas, and a recognition 
that accountability is a key lever 
for implementation. Importantly, 
Rio+20 and its focus on the 
institutional challenges to sustainable 
development provide an opportunity 
to bring the issues of accountability 
and implementation to the forefront.
This paper seeks to develop a 
practical agenda for institutional 
reform to improve implementation 
by identifying a set of incremental 
and plausible steps in two areas: (a) 
strengthening the mechanics that 
cultivate accountability, and (b) 
putting into place the institutional 
arrangements that nurture these 
mechanics. A first and important 
step, however, is to recognize 
the aforementioned ‘culture of 
unaccountability.’ 
the Culture of 
unaccountability
A ‘culture of unaccountability’ is 
perhaps the most significant enabler 
of unaccountability and, thus, lack 
of implementation in GEG. It is 
important to understand why the 
culture of unaccountability has 
become such a pervasive feature of 
the GEG system. Our previous work 
(Najam and Halle 2010) identified 
several reasons.
Global environmental governance 
is declaratory in nature, relying on 
values-based and knowledge-based 
persuasion, in contrast to other 
‘rules-based’ areas of international 
governance. The dominant culture 
is one of moral persuasion — GEG 
efforts are generally based on the 
premise that if all countries do the 
‘right thing,’ this is good not only 
for them, but for everyone else. This 
approach, however, leads to the 
classic free-rider problem. Rules-
based GEG exists — e.g. ozone and 
CITES — but, as best exemplified 
by the Kyoto Protocol, rules-based 
GEG has severe accountability and 
compliance deficits.
The GEG system has evolved within 
a negotiation paradigm, rather than 
an implementation mindset. The 
accelerated growth in the number 
and intensity of GEG negotiations 
during the last two decades has 
resulted in an over-heated, never-
ending negotiation system that 
can sometimes see negotiation 
as its primary function and goal. 
Environmental institutions have 
morphed into — and see themselves 
as — negotiation support services. As 
a result, GEG efforts are measured 
by negotiation metrics rather than by 
actual environmental improvements. 
Often, implementation stakeholders 
have little ownership of the treaties 
that they inherit from the negotiators. 
Developing countries’ few resources 
are siphoned off to servicing 
the appetites of international 
negotiation, at the expense of 
domestic implementation. 
Global realities are being shaped by 
forces beyond the nation-state, yet 
key actors remain unrepresented 
in the GEG system. Despite well-
meaning yet token participation, 
most non-state actors — whether civil 
society groups, business interests, 
or local communities — have no 
real tools to hold the international 
system accountable for its actions (or 
inaction); nor does the international 
system have any real tools with which 
to engage with civil society. 
Beyond shaming, there is no 
disincentive for failing to implement. 
Shaming itself becomes less effective 
as repeated failure leads to an 
increased culture of unaccountability, 
where the norm seems to be that 
implementation of commitments is 
optional, rather than mandatory. In 
addition, there is a short institutional 
memory of who committed or 
failed to implement what, which 
leads to further impunity for failing 
to implement, even for the soft 
standards of naming and shaming. 
towards more 
Accountability: A  
pragmatic Agenda
It is impossible to undo the culture 
of unaccountability with the stroke 
of a pen. As any large organization 
knows, institutional cultures cannot 
be changed overnight, and changes 
require long-term dedicated top-
level commitment. What is needed 
is a set of ‘radically incremental’ 
steps to begin creating an alternative 
culture of accountability that 
refines, reinforces and rewards the 
habits of accountability within 
the international system, while 
discouraging unaccountability. 
This can be done by identifying 
those elements within the GEG 
system that are doable today and 
will begin developing a culture of 
accountability, steering the system 
in the right direction. These steps 
include enabling accountability 
mechanics and enabling institutional 
arrangements, both of which are 
discussed in greater detail below. 
enAbling ACCountAbility 
meChAniCs
We define accountability mechanics 
as those measures that cultivate 
and facilitate accountability. These 
include metrics and reporting, 
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It is important to emphasize that 
good indicators and reporting 
cost money, both for monitoring 
and data collection, and for the 
actual preparation and submission 
of reports. For instance, the cost 
of preparing a single national 
report on implementation for 
the UN Convention to Combat 
Desertification has been estimated 
at approximately US$56,000. Even 
such modest estimations, if spread 
across the spectrum of multi-lateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs) 
and the GEG system, quickly escalate 
to significant amounts. Thus, 
improved metrics and reporting 
requirements cannot be slapped into 
an agreement as an afterthought, 
but need to be conceived and 
endowed with appropriate resources. 
Importantly, there are synergies and 
economies to be had if reporting 
metrics for different MEAs are 
coordinated and cross-learning  
is encouraged.
In addition to being appropriately 
funded, reporting needs to be more 
effective in conveying meaningful 
information. Volume after volume 
after volume of reports may keep 
transparency, compliance, and 
capacity building. 
1.  improved metrics and 
reporting mechanics
Effective mandated reporting 
requirements must be defined to 
gauge progress against obligations 
and commitments, using agreed 
upon sets of performance indicators. 
Improved metrics are required, 
especially metrics that measure 
actual progress in environmental 
matters, rather than effort. In 
physics, moving a single brick 
represents more work than pushing 
a wall for days. In a fitting analogy, 
for the GEG system we want to know 
how many environmental bricks have 
been moved, not how many years 
governments spent pushing against 
walls. Particularly relevant are  
metrics reflecting bottom-up and 
local approaches. After all, action 
and implementation are ultimately 
local affairs. 
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Accountability in the geg system
There are at least three different types of accountability in the GEG system that need to be addressed separately:
Accountability to mandate.  Is an international organization accomplishing what it was created to accomplish? Businesses are 
most clear on this type of accountability, which is measured by their bottom lines. International organizations are surprisingly 
silent on this. For example, a treaty secretariat or national representative is more likely to tell you how many meetings were 
held and how many decisions were made than to say whether, how, and to what extent the purpose of the treaty was advanced 
because of these meetings and decisions.
Institutional accountability.  Is an organization well- managed? Managerial processes, such as hiring, staff performance and 
reward, budgetary controls, etc., have occasionally become the subject of public discussion, but usually only when they become 
‘scandals,’ raised by those who wish to discredit the GEG system. Supporters of the GEG system often choose to wink, nod, and 
ignore blatant managerial abuse in international organizations, thus being complicit in a conspiracy of silence, just because they 
do not wish to strengthen the hands of those out to ‘cut the system down to size.’
Accountability to constituency.  Whom are international organizations accountable to? This gets straight to the power politics of 
institutions, including inter-state, intra-state and non-state actor politics. It can be argued that global citizenry is the constituency of 
global environmental institutions, with Member States acting as custodians. While global citizenry interacts with global institutions 
through the state apparatus, in doing so it does not cede its right to hold these institutions and their actions accountable.
Adapted from: Adil Najam and Mark Halle, “Global Environmental Governance: The Challenge of Accountability.” Sustainable Development Insights, 
No.5, May 2010
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their authors busy, but mostly go 
unread and join their predecessors 
in the ever-growing pile feeding the 
global data overload. We need better 
reporting, not more reports. Effective 
reporting places asymmetrical 
requirements on different countries. 
Developing countries will require 
assistance for capacity-building 
and other enabling measures, while 
developed countries need to take 
the lead with clear and accurate 
reporting, including on fulfillment 
of existing commitments. Reporting, 
particularly self-reporting, also has 
asymmetrical consequences, where 
weaker parties can be penalized (for 
example by donors) for reporting 
failure, while more powerful 
countries face no repercussions. 
This needs to be recognized and 
addressed if effective reporting is  
to be achieved. 
2.  improved transparency 
mechanics
Transparency is a key element of 
accountability, especially with regard 
to review and monitoring programs. 
There are different review models, 
each with their advantages and 
drawbacks. The essential element 
is that the monitoring of GEG 
performance becomes independently 
verifiable and allows the involvement 
of third parties. Existing review 
mechanisms include those based 
on self-reviews, third-party reviews, 
and peer-reviews. An example of 
third-party review is the OECD’s 
Environmental Performance Review 
(EPR) Programme, while a review 
based on voluntary national 
presentations is exemplified by the 
MDG Annual Ministerial Review. 
Peer-reviews are a growing area of 
interest, with examples found in 
OECD DAC peer reviews, NEPAD’s 
African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM), or nationally-initiated peer-
reviews, such as France’s peer-review 
of National Sustainable Development 
Strategies. Other review approaches 
are being explored, including UNEP’s 
work on MEA review methodology, 
or bottom-up approaches based on 
local review mechanisms. Review 
mechanisms have to be conceived 
and understood as collaborative 
efforts in the context of eradication 
of the culture of unaccountability, 
rather than as an impingement 
on sovereignty or stepping into 
some other agency’s mandate. 
Environmental leaders need to set 
this culture in motion by voluntarily 
initiating such performance reviews to 
establish themselves as the purveyors 
of best practice. Once enough of 
them take the lead in this, it will 
become more and more difficult for 
other actors not to follow suit. 
Monitoring is a task where NGOs 
and whistle blowers have traditionally 
been active, either in a collaborative 
way, such as the civil society-led 
wildlife trade monitoring network, 
TRAFFIC, or through a more 
aggressive approach, such as the 
Environmental Intelligence Agency.
The internet and information 
technologies open a new range of 
possibilities for monitoring and 
transparency. From a top-down or 
centralized perspective, the possibility 
of transmitting and revealing large 
quantities of information at the click 
of a mouse allows for centralized 
transparency or ‘raw’ accountability. 
Wikileaks has already had an impact 
on climate change and other MEA 
negotiations. While the jury is out 
on whether such data dumps are 
good or bad for the overall health 
of the system, the number of similar 
episodes is likely to grow. Given the 
predictable recurrence, it would 
be wise to conceptualize ways in 
which the impact of such ‘leaks’ 
can be positively channeled towards 
accountability and implementation.
3.  improved Compliance 
mechanics
An effective set of compliance 
incentives entails a delicate balance 
of ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots.’ The problem 
of accountability is not only that the 
system does not punish bad behavior, 
but also that it does not reward good 
behavior. A system of incentives for 
better performance with rewards for 
good behavior and early action is 
needed to complement monitoring 
and penalty-based approaches. 
Rewards for countries who live up 
to their commitments, for example, 
could include trade preferences, or 
preferential access to international 
credit or to global support funds 
such as the Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF). There is ample 
precedent of needs-based preferential 
treatment, so perhaps it is also time 
for performance-based preferential 
treatment. It must be stressed that 
a country’s performance should not 
only be compared to that of similar 
countries, but, most importantly, 
against itself. Is a country doing 
better over time? 
The transparency mechanisms 
discussed above should be linked 
directly to compliance. The key 
element is for the information to 
clearly show whether agreements are 
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“Theinternetandinformationtechnologiesopenanewrangeof
possibilitiesformonitoringandtransparency.”
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of accountability, including 
by strengthening the habits of 
accountability and reinforcing 
these habits in a positive fashion. 
Institutions are important, but they 
will only succeed to the extent that 
they manage to change the culture 
of unaccountability, thus ensuring 
accountability and implementation in 
the longer-term. 
being complied with or not. Such 
information, when available across 
countries, will itself become a source 
of real pressure on countries to 
improve their image — i.e., be seen to 
be compliant to, rather than deviant 
from, their global responsibilities.
4. Capacity building
The need for more and better 
capacity building in developing 
countries is a permanent demand in 
the GEG system. The lack of capacity 
in developing countries is a real and 
urgent problem that, among its many 
consequences, perpetuates the lack 
of accountability (for both developed 
and developing countries) and makes 
implementation more difficult, and 
sometimes impossible. The role 
of capacity building in improving 
accountability and implementation 
cannot be underestimated. However, 
the key question — as in so many 
capacity building issues — is capacity 
for whom and capacity for what?
To begin with, capacity enhancement 
for improved reporting, transparency, 
and compliance is needed. Moreover, 
it is needed at the national (and 
sometimes local) levels. In essence, 
we are talking about the capacity to 
implement and the capacity to be 
able to account for implementation. 
The creation of structural and 
permanent capacity in developing 
countries to monitor, report, and 
analyze information related to 
implementation is an urgent need. 
Importantly, such capacity is needed 
in governmental as well as non-
governmental institutions so that 
effective networks for accountability 
can be created and sustained.
enAbling institutionAl 
ArrAngements
Institutional arrangements are 
needed to nurture accountability 
mechanics and foster a culture 
h i g h - l e v e l  b r A i n s t o r m i n g  s e s s i o n :  
“Accountability and implementation:  
the Keys to sustainable development”
The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range 
Future at Boston University co-hosted a side event on “Accountability 
and Implementation: The Keys to Sustainable Development” at the 
Second Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development (Rio+20) on March 8, 2011. 
The event, supported by the Nordic UN Missions of Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden to the United Nations in New York, 
was attended by senior diplomats, nongovernmental experts, and 
scholars, and served as a high-level brainstorming session to identify 
key steps towards accountability and implementation in the global 
environmental governance system. The session was chaired by Amb. 
Carsten Staur (Denmark), facilitated by Prof. Adil Najam (BU Pardee 
Center), and included presentations by Sen. Elizabeth Thompson 
(Barbados), Dr. André Aranha Corrêa do Lago (Brazil), Dr. Asad Khan 
(Pakistan), Amb. Irene Freudenschuss-Reichl (Austria), and  
Dr. Bradnee Chambers (UNEP).
The brainstorming session with senior practitioners provided valuable 
input into the ideas presented in this paper. The session highlighted 
the fact that accountability is now clearly seen as a key challenge for all 
global governance, including for governance in pursuit of sustainable 
development, and especially in the context of Rio+20 discussions. 
While there is wide support in both North and South for addressing 
accountability concerns, the preferred approaches of various actors 
range from largely voluntary initiatives to more mandatory measures. 
The urgency for a meaningful response, however, seems shared by all.
1. Compendium of best practices
One component of encouraging 
a cultural shift away from 
unaccountability is to establish a 
compendium of best practices in 
accountability. Despite the prevailing 
culture of unaccountability in GEG, 
throughout the system there are 
cases and examples of good practice. 
These cases need to be documented 
and understood, both to avoid 
reinventing the wheel and to increase 
the levels of expectation. Recognizing 
and rewarding (even if just by 
acknowledging) good practice will 
likely foster replication and nudge 
the system towards a culture of 
accountability. 
The compendium should not be 
conceived as one more publication. 
After all, as mentioned above, what 
is needed is better information, not 
more reports. The compendium 
of best practices, then, should be 
conceived as a dynamic learning 
process, where best practices 
are not only compiled, but also 
dissected and analyzed, providing 
the added value of highlighting 
what worked where, when, and 
why. Within this framework, a 
publication providing a yearly 
snapshot could be presented at the 
annual meeting of the Commission 
on Sustainable Development (CSD) 
with the main goal of celebrating 
and acknowledging good practice, 
thus reinforcing a system of positive 
rewards. Different from other 
reports, such a compendium could 
‘live’ on the internet — in a manner 
that allows it to be dynamically 
accessed as well as updated.
Any such compendium would 
be greatly strengthened if it also 
included information on ‘bad 
practice,’ if only as exemplars of 
what is to be avoided. Knowing  
best practice helps us to avoid 
reinventing the wheel; knowing bad 
practice prevents us from stumbling 
twice against the same stone. The 
idea should not be to shame, but to 
outline a clear sense of what is not 
desirable and why.
2. registry of Commitments
With very few exceptions, every 
conference of the parties (CoP), 
subsidiary body, and any other 
GEG meeting results in decisions, 
conclusions, declarations, plans of 
action/implementation and a myriad 
of other agreements that ultimately 
boil down to commitments. How 
many commitments, by whom, and 
on what? Which ones have been 
fulfilled? No one really knows, as 
many commitments are already 
forgotten by the time the next 
meeting is held and most remain 
unimplemented. 
There is an urgent need for a 
centralized registry of commitments 
that keeps track of which country 
or institution has agreed to do 
what, and the extent to which that 
commitment has been fulfilled. 
Having an open, transparent, 
and easily accessible record of all 
commitments will have a healthy 
effect on the system and keep 
negotiators from re-inventing the 
wheel over and over again. With 
the register of commitments, 
negotiators will have a handy 
reference to existing agreements 
and an incentive to make only those 
commitments that countries have 
the intention or capacity to fulfill. 
Most importantly, such a register will 
move the focus away from the need 
to be seen to reaching agreement 
on ‘new’ commitments (even when 
they are not new at all) and towards 
a discussion of how well we are 
doing — or not — in fulfilling ‘old’ 
commitments.
The proposed registry could quickly 
evolve from a mere compilation 
of commitments to a system of 
commitment tracking and reporting. 
Similar mechanisms are being 
developed in an ad hoc basis for 
specific issue-areas, such as climate 
finance, but no GEG-wide registry 
system is in place. Examples include 
OECD’s tracking of development 
financing, or the proposal for GEG 
finance tracking (Najam and Muñoz 
2008). Institutionally, UNEP would 
perhaps be best placed to host this 
register since it has the institution-
wide mandate for information 
gathering and knowledge creation. 
Indeed, placing such a system within 
UNEP would also serve to strengthen 
UNEP in other significant ways. For 
example, it would provide a renewed 
reason for better inter-institution 
coordination, especially between 
MEA secretariats and UN agencies 
and programmes.
3. (re)new(ed) Focus for Csd
Recent events at the Commission on 
Sustainable Development (CSD) have 
again highlighted the fact that it is an 
institution with a forever uncertain 
future. Constrained by the straight 
jacket of a rather inflexible 14 year 
Programme of Work, its negotiation 
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“Thereisanurgentneedforacentralizedregistryofcommitments
thatkeepstrackofwhichcountryorinstitutionhasagreedtodo
what,andtheextenttowhichthatcommitmenthasbeenfulfilled.”
two decades. Accountability of GEG 
(as well as the other dimensions of 
Global Governance for Sustainable 
Development) would become the key 
function of the CSD. 
We envision a reporting process 
where secretariats would be tasked 
(and given the necessary tools 
and mandate) to assess progress 
towards the respective goals of their 
organizations, and to develop their 
reports based but not dependent on 
national reporting. The focus would 
be measuring actual progress, rather 
than effort, as illustrated earlier 
with the ‘pushing the wall’ analogy. 
Importantly, the idea is not that 
agencies report ‘to’ the CSD, but that 
they report ‘at’ the CSD. This is a key 
distinction. The idea here is for the 
CSD to return to its conception as 
a forum that brings together the key 
actors in GEG to take stock of where 
we are in our global commitment to 
sustainable development, what have 
we achieved, and what still remains 
to be done. The idea is not to give 
the CSD a punitive or regulatory role, 
but rather to turn it into a venue 
for an ongoing assessment of the 
global progress towards sustainable 
development.
4.  towards a global instrument 
(‘A global Aarhus’)
Ultimately we are ready to move 
towards the next step of creating 
a global legal instrument to 
role severely weakened by an inability 
to deliver, the CSD clearly needs to 
rediscover itself again. Born from 
the Rio Earth Summit 20 years ago, 
CSD has the perfect opportunity at 
Rio+20 to reach back to its roots 
and renew itself as the agency it was 
originally designed to be.
Revisiting the original mandate of 
CSD provides useful inspiration, par-
ticularly in terms of how important 
the accountability and implementa-
tion role was in the original design 
of this platform. For example, the 
original architects of the CSD had 
envisaged its role as including: 
“monitor progress in […] activities related 
to the integration of environmental and 
developmental goals throughout the United 
Nations system through analysis and evalu-
ation of reports from all relevant organs, 
organizations, programmes and institutions 
of the United Nations system dealing with 
various issues of environment and develop-
ment;” and “consider […] information 
regarding the progress made in the imple-
mentation of environmental conventions.”
Thus, we propose that the CSD 
returns to its original purpose, and 
becomes a reporting and assessment 
hub, the place where the world meets 
once a year to assess and to report 
on progress towards sustainable 
development, including on 
environmental issues. It would thus 
cease to act as a negotiating forum 
and embrace its original design more 
wholeheartedly than it has in its first 
enhance greater accountability in 
environmental governance.
The Economic Commission for 
Europe’s Aarhus Convention on 
Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters is a working model that 
has been widely cited as a success. 
The Aarhus convention, however, is 
regionally limited in scope. It may 
be time for a global instrument, 
a global version of the Aarhus 
Convention, to improve the GEG 
system and move it towards a new 
culture of accountability. As we begin 
preparations for the 2012 Rio+20 
conference, negotiation of such a 
global instrument might be a goal 
that Rio+20 sets for itself. If the great 
achievement of the Rio conference 
in 1992 was that it triggered a 
surge of global environmental 
negotiations and environmental 
instruments, it would be a fitting 
goal for Rio+20 to put together 
a robust system of accountability 
around these negotiations and 
instruments. Such an instrument 
clearly would be Aarhus-plus. Not 
only because it would be global, 
but more importantly because it 
could incorporate the type of steps 
and recommendations outlined in 
this paper: an umbrella agreement 
which brings together a system 
of better accountability for better 
implementation in GEG. •
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“...weproposethattheCSDreturnstoitsoriginal
purpose,andbecomesareportingandassessment
hub,theplacewheretheworldmeetsonceayearto
assessandtoreportonprogresstowardssustainable
development,includingonenvironmentalissues.”
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